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Abstract
Poor and insufficient school infrastructure negatively impacts student learning and
schooling outcomes. Myriad factors have contributed to an infrastructure gap in the
education sector in many countries – rapid increases in enrolments, poor maintenance and
aging capital stocks, rural to urban migration, and inefficient government planning and
school construction to name a few. Various forms of decentralization are likely to be
involved both to improve governance and accountability and to foster innovation and cost
saving in the school construction industry and investment and project cycle.
This paper first discusses why the topic is interesting and worth considering; next we lay
out the issues and considerations specific to educational infrastructure decentralization;
we then connect the discussion to the broader infrastructure discussions in the other
papers as well as to the education decentralization literature. We examine an illustrative
case study in Egypt exemplifying both the typical centralization of a national school
construction authority, and the reasons for countries to consider certain kinds of
decentralization. The case also highlights that school construction reforms involving
potential decentralization are a long slog dominated and driven by politics. We provide a
framework for un-packaging and considering key components of the processes involved
in service provision and some promising strategies relating to decentralization. We
conclude with some insights for practitioners and others interested in advancing
knowledge of the topic.
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Introduction: The Potential Importance of Decentralization, Accountability and
Educational Infrastructure
Poor and insufficient school infrastructure negatively impact student learning and
schooling outcomes. Myriad factors have contributed to an infrastructure gap in the
education sector in many countries – rapid increases in enrolments, poor
maintenance and aging capital stocks, rural to urban migration, and inefficient
government planning and school construction to name a few. By some estimates, as
many as 10 million classrooms and $100 billion in infrastructure investment are
needed just to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs);1 which means, the overall global challenges are far bigger.2 Meeting the
challenges may require increased funding, but it will also require improved
efficiency of infrastructure provision. Various forms of decentralization are likely to
be involved both to improve governance and accountability and to foster innovation
and cost saving in the school construction industry and investment and project
cycle.
Over the past three decades plus, a great deal has been written about infrastructure
decentralization, and nearly as much about educational decentralization. Very little,
however, has been written on decentralization issues pertaining specifically to
educational infrastructure and school construction – and even less in developing
country contexts. This paper first discusses why the topic is interesting and worth
considering; next we lay out the issues and considerations specific to educational
infrastructure decentralization; we then connect the discussion to the broader
infrastructure discussions in the other papers as well as to the education
decentralization literature. We examine an illustrative case study in Egypt
exemplifying both the typical centralization of a national school construction
authority, and the reasons for countries to consider certain kinds of
decentralization. The case also highlights that school construction reforms involving
potential decentralization are a long slog dominated and driven by politics. We
review and highlight the results of a rare, detailed study in Sub-Saharan Africa. We
conclude with some insights for practitioners and others interested in advancing
knowledge of the topic.
We are not able to conclude under what circumstances and conditions
infrastructure responsibilities should be assigned to different levels of governance.
We argue that this critical question should be on the research agenda of the
development community and we discuss how educational infrastructure
decentralization might be different from recurrent expenditures. In addition, the
Source: TI-UP.org Delivering Cost Effective and Sustainable School Infrastructure. (Bonner et al, n.d.)
And the infrastructure issues extend well beyond classroom construction. In fact, classroom
construction may only be about 60% of investment costs; the non-classroom infrastructure
associated with school construction include water and sanitation, furniture, ICT, and office space for
administration. Theunynck (2009).
1
2
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very significant role of education (and school construction specifically) in subnational budgets in the U.S. and Europe suggests considerable scope for expansion
in developing world. We suggest some key areas where the interactions between
recurrent and capital expenditures are likely to be important. Most infrastructure
decisions are a mix of central, regional, local, community, and/or private
actors. That makes any categorization even more complicated, and one objective of
the paper is to provide a framework for un-packaging and considering key
components of the processes involved in service provision and some promising
strategies relating to decentralization.
The sparse literature on educational infrastructure decentralization is surprising
given the magnitude of the needs, the clearly distinctive issues involved in
educational infrastructure compared to other sectors, and the extent of
centralization found in many countries. The financial scope is bigger than implied by
capital expenditure figures because, like much “point” infrastructure associated
with service provision, there is strong interplay between current service provision,
on the one hand, and capital investment and school construction, on the other. As
but one example, once built, schools must have teachers whose salaries are the most
significant recurrent expenditures in many government budgets.
In addition, while it may seem obvious, it is worth stating explicitly that there are
many reasons why, and modes through which, school infrastructure is related to
student outcomes and performance. To highlight just a few:
 School proximity to home impacts attendance—travel and safety;
 The quality of infrastructure impacts enrolment and completion rates,
learning outcomes as well as teacher absenteeism (This is particularly true
for water and sanitation facilities).
 It is also very important to parental perception and satisfaction with school
quality, and therefore is (or should be) an important feature of politicians’
calculus.
In addition, while investment expenditures represent a small share of the total (for
instance when compared to health sector expenditures), there are several factors
that compound the fiscal impact of educational infrastructure investments. Perhaps
the most important factor is that infrastructure investments have an impact over
teacher and payroll costs, which make up by far the lion’s share of education
expenditures. In addition to the impact on teacher effectiveness mentioned above,
every school construction project implies an allocation of teachers to school
buildings.
Thus, the topic of educational infrastructure and decentralization is an important
one to the extent there is promise for cost reduction and other improvements in
efficiency. In addition, during the so called “massification” of educational access—
periods in which a country is pushing to vastly expand enrolment quickly,

4
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centralization may indeed be successful. As reforms become more complicated,
more about effectiveness, efficiency and quality, the need to decentralize is likely to
increase. Urbanization has also contributed to these needs. Indeed, many if not most
countries now find and least part of their education system at such stages of
development, making the topic even more timely.
Educational Capital Investment, Sources & Uses of Funds & Locus of Decision-making
Before developing and then applying a decentralization typology specifically to
school construction issues and the stakeholders most often connected to it, it is
instructive to consider the level of capital spending in the education sector across
and within countries. There are wide variations between countries in capital
expenditure. Figure 1 shows capital expenditures in basic education as a proportion
of the total education budget for a selection of countries for 2009. Clearly the
expenditure effort is greatly varied across countries. The OECD average (not
shown) is approximately 9%.
FIGURE 1 : Primary and Secondary Educational Capital expenditure,
% of total public educational expenditure, Selected Countries, 2009
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Source: Author’s calculations from EdStats (2009, except where indicated by 08). ISCED 1,2,3, & 4

There are no clearly discernable patterns, and an additional analysis that ordered
the countries by various broad measures of decentralization, yielded no
relationship.3 One surprising observation is the rather low level of educational
3

We used data on subnational government expenditures as a proportion of total government
expenditures for 2009 or the most recent year available (cash or accrual basis) as an index for fiscal
decentralization. We lose five countries from the sample in the figure, and we observe no pattern.
There are very few countries reporting subnational educational expenditure as a proportion of total
educational expenditure so we are unable to use an education-specific fiscal decentralization index.
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capital investment from the large federal states in Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, and
Argentina. Where as some of the more recently decentralized countries like Peru
are quite high, perhaps because of new investments being channeled through
subnational governments, which often happens during early stages of
decentralization.
Figure 2 shows that in some cases expenditures vary a great deal from year to year.
But appear steady over time in others, and that this is true both in countries where
spending is high and those where it is lower. 4
Of course, these figures tell us nothing about the level of government (or school)
responsible for which components of the capital investment. Very little information
exists to allow legitimate comparisons across countries. However, we were able to
use the locus of decision-making framework in OECD’s Education at a Glance to
examine the range of centralization and decentralization in a sample of countries—
some of which are considered emerging or developing—albeit that the survey only
covers a small part of the universe of decisions relevant to educational capital
investment (See Annex 1).
Mexico, for example, appears highly centralized with respect to capital
expenditures, despite significant decentralization in the provision of education
services over the past three decades. The central government alone allocated
school-level capital expenditures and decides how they are spent. On the other
hand, Mexican states do have autonomy over the decision to create or close a school.
The high level of decentralization regarding these three decisions in Chile is
consistent with the educational reforms there over the past three decades. With the
exception of the Slovak Republic, the ECA countries all appear decentralized with
some like Hungary even requiring school-level consultation on capital spending
decisions.

The results are available upon request from the author. The data for the index was take from the
World Bank’s fiscal decentralization web page: www.worldbank.org/publicfinance/decentralization
4 One reviewer questioned the credibility of the data on Bangladesh, given that the capital
expenditure appears so high. Given that these data come directly from EdStats, and that it is beyond
the scope of this study to verify the accuracy of such broadly-used data sources, it will suffice to note
that spending levels in Bangaldesh are likely high and steady, even if the precise numbers must be
used with caution.

6
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FIGURE 2 : Primary and Secondary Educational Capital expenditure,
% of total public educational expenditure, Selected Countries, 2007-2009

Source: Author’s calculations from EdStats. ISCED 1,2,3, & 4

Connecting Educational Infrastructure and School Construction to the
Decentralization and Accountability Literature
While the traditional education decentralization literature focuses, almost
exclusively on service provision (recurrent expenditure), the typologies of
decentralization and accountability developed in this literature are largely relevant
to the discussion of infrastructure provision. For instance, we should distinguish
between “Decentralization to Sub-national Governments” and “Decentralization to
Schools” (most commonly School Based Management (SBM), school autonomy,
community and parental involvement, school choice, client power, etc).
While distinct, the two forms of educational decentralization are not mutually
exclusive and are often intertwined in reform processes. Rondinelli’s classic
framework is clearly relevant regarding Deconcentration, Delegation, Devolution,
Privatization.5
Rondinelli (1981, 1986, & 1989) created the original basic vocabulary for describing the various ways
in which governments may be expected to pursue administrative decentralization. It is important to note
that very rarely can any given reform be given one single label. That is, any reform is likely to be a
complex combination of each of these sets of arrangements.. Accountability for the results of decisions
remains largely bureaucratic, vertical, and internal to the executive branch, but sub-national entities can
make decisions and report ex-post on the decision or the results of the decisions. 1) Deconcentration
involves the central or federal government granting greater authority to its own sub-national authorities
5
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Table 1: Education Infrastructure Decentralization Matrix
Education
Deconcentration
to Regional
Government
Offices and
Regional MOE
Offices
Devolution to
regional or local
governments

Administrative
Move managerial
decisions and managerial
accountability to
regional offices of central
government and MOE.

Fiscal
Give regional managers
greater authority to
allocate and reallocate
budgets.

Political
Create regional, elected
bodies to advise regional
managers.

Education sector
managers are appointed
by elected officials at
local or regional level.

Elected regional or local
officials of general
purpose governments are
ultimately accountable
both to voters and to
sources of finance for the
delivery of schooling.

Delegation
(and/or
Devolution) to
schools and/or
school councils

School principals and/or
school councils
empowered to make
personnel, curriculum,
and some spending
decisions.
Government responsible
for provision, but
delegates operational
autonomy to implement
large-scale small
construction programs, to
be carried out by small
contractors with local
labor.

Give subnational
governments power to
allocate education
spending and, in some
cases, to determine
spending levels (i.e.,
through raising
revenues).
School principals and/or
school councils receive
government funding and
can allocate spending and
raise revenues.
Funds provided by
government (central,
regional local, perhaps
with community input)
but handles largely by
delegated agencies. Cost
savings in some cases.

Elected officials of
general purpose
governments are, ideally,
ultimately accountable to
voters and to sources of
finance for the delivery of
schooling. How this
works in practice is key.
Agencies may buffer
officials
School councils are often
popularly elected.
Government is still
usually responsible for
service provision, though
not the direct provider.

Delegation to
NGOs, Contract
Management
Agencies (CMAs)
and/or Social
Funds

Implicit
delegation to
community
schools and
community based
approaches

School principals and/or
community school
councils make key
decisions.

Some self-financing or
local inputs with some
government subsidies,
especially in remote
areas where public
schools are not present.

School councils are
elected or appointed,
often with power to name
school principals.

under its direct control. It is the weakest form of decentralization for it does not transfer any significant
authority to sub-national governments. 2) Delegation involves creating semi-autonomous agencies, such
as state-owned enterprises or public corporations. 3) Devolution entails the transfer of service delivery
responsibility to independent sub-national levels of government, regions, provinces, municipalities, etc.;
Accountability is now horizontal and takes place, to some degree, between the local executive and the
local representative branches of government 4) Privatization is often considered the most far-reaching
form of decentralization. Early studies focused on fiscal decentralization; that is, the decentralization of
functions related to public finance and public financial management. Fiscal decentralization can be
further divided into two broad categories: 1) revenue-side fiscal decentralization, which involves
granting sub-national levels of government greater control over tax and other revenue sources, and 2)
expenditure-side fiscal decentralization, which involves greater expenditure responsibility on the part of
sub-national governments. Revenue-side fiscal decentralization almost always includes expenditure-side
fiscal decentralization; however, the latter may take place without the former, with the central
government usually transferring financial resources to sub-national governments via grants or revenue
sharing schemes. Again, nearly all reforms exhibits aspects of several of these trends.
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Gershberg and Winkler (2004) adapted this typology to education, and we present it
here in Table 1, with slight adaptations to highlight the relevance for infrastructure
provision. Naturally, this is a gross oversimplification. For instance, each “cell” of the
table could be further subdivided into at least four cells to delineate school design,
school location, school construction, and school maintenance, as we discuss later.6
In addition, it is not particularly useful (or even correct) to try to attach any one of
these decentralization “types” to any given reform. Rather, it is important to
understand how performance accountability works, or is intended to work, and
these concepts are likely to be useful in identifying how accountability flows
through the system. Any given reform will indeed be a complex combination of each
of these “types.”
Of course, the regulations and laws relating to any particular aspect usually differ in
important ways from the rules of the game in practice. For instance, with
administrative deconcentration, while there may be some managerial decision
making transferred to local offices of central agencies, this is often coupled with expost accountability upwards, at least for results. 7
Before proceeding to consider capital expenditures and school construction
explicitly, it is worth reviewing the potential (theoretical) gains and drawbacks of
decentralization, as well as what Gershberg and Jacobs (1998) aptly called
recentralization because of the need to consider the interplay and changing nature
of the role of the center during so-called decentralization:
“[D]isaggregating the different aspects of accountability … makes clear that, in many respects,
the expected improvement [from decentralization] requires both greater autonomy for the local
service provider, and also strengthened performance of some central functions. We refer to this
necessary strengthening of central functions as recentralization.” Gershberg & Jacobs (1998)

Table 2 summarizes the arguments for and the attributes of decentralization and
recentralization.

Policy makers involved in such reform processes would benefit from such an efforts specific to their
country and regional contexts.
7 An example might be when a district manager can decide what type of automobiles to buy for the
district office, but if he is found to have broken rules, or the cars turn out to be poor quality or poor
choices, the district managers are accountable upwards back to the home office. Another way to
categorize reforms within this typology is the extent to which different components of
decentralization may be conceived as horizontal or vertical. In the case of administrative devolution
or the political aspects of delegation to schools, the accountability becomes horizontal. To me this is
the key issue: whether accountability becomes more horizontal (devolution) or stays vertical
(deconcentration).
6
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Table 2: Arguments for and against decentralization and recentralization

Adapted from Gershberg and Jacobs (1998)

Key Stakeholders and Institutional Actors in School Construction
Many, and probably most developing countries, have a central School Construction
Authority (SCA) of some kind. In developed countries, each local school district
(especially in large cities) may have it’s own local SCA. The other stakeholders and
institutional actors are similar to those of interest in any discussion of
decentralization of service provision.
 Central School Construction Authority (SCA)
o The SCA May or may not be part of MOE (e.g. may be located in the
Ministry of Planning or Public Works)
o The SCA May or may not be semi-autonomous even within MOE (i.e., it
may have its own administrative structure and the Minister may not
have full authority over it.

10
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 Other ministries (planning, local development, finance, transport/roads, etc):
for instance, in many countries the ministry responsible for civil works takes
on the actual construction of schools.
 Sub-national governments
 Quasi-public authorities, Social Funds, Contract Management Agencies, etc.
 Community and School level stakeholders
 Intermediary and other NGOs
 Private Sector (construction companies, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs),
bond and other capital markets
Each of these stakeholders will be discussed in the following sections about phases
and taxonomies for educational infrastructure. It is instructive to note that there are
many potential institutions and stakeholders (most likely well over 10 in any given
country context) and that sub-national governments—often the focus of
decentralization reforms—are only one among many others.
Components of Educational Infrastructure Provision That May Be Decentralized, or
Not
While there is considerable heterogeneity, school construction generally has key
components, each of which may or may not be undertaken or managed in a
centralized or decentralized manner. Note that while these components are in some
sense sequential “phases” conceptually, there is often considerable overlap and
iteration between them in practice.
1. School Design. Usually at the very least, there are minimum design and
construction standards that are set at the central government level. 8 These
involve a range of issues of central concern: safety, equity, efficiency and may
also be connected to pedagogy (for instance if the MOE is transitioning to an
open classroom setting for constructivist teaching methods). However, it is
not uncommon for many if not most aspects of school design to be controlled
centrally—including building and floor plans, construction methods and
materials. It is, thus, not uncommon to find school design nearly uniform
throughout even very geographically diverse countries.9
2.

School Location. Whatever level of government is responsible for access to
schooling is likely to play a strong role in the decision about where new
schools will be located or existing schools expanded. This is true even if that

There are examples where such standards are set at the local or regional level, but in the developing
world they appear to be rare. In addition, donor projects may be exempt from these standards and
have their own.
9 This author first experienced the homogeneity of rural school design resulting from centralization,
despite tremendous geographic heterogeneity in Mexico in the early 1990s—where school materials
and design were the same whether in the high sierra or the coastal plains.
8
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level of government does not actually provides schooling services. Thus, school
location, school expansion, school creation, and school closure decisions tend
to me more centralized than other aspects of a system. Where increasing
enrolment is a chief concern (e.g., in countries seeking to achieve the education
MDGs), the central government has an interest in how to maximize national
enrollments (often resulting in a rural bias). Equity is also key concern as are
efficiency, scale economies, and cost containment—all of which, at least in
theory, have aspects that benefit from centralized provision. On the other
hand, these valid concerns for some degree of centralism could also be
addressed in a more decentralized system via funding formulas and grants,
thus leave more of the key decisions to the more local body.10 Namely,
weighting central funding formula, regional targeting policy and priorities to
provinces or regions with significant disadvantaged populations (e.g., out of
school children, or over-crowding, etc.).
Land acquisition is also a major issue, since the “ideal” location for a school
from a planning perspective may not contain land owned by the government
for the purpose. Land acquisition issues are particularly challenging in urban
areas where vacant land is scarce and it is difficult to procure plots large
enough to fulfill centralized design and construction standards. Governments
are often reticent, or bureaucratically challenged, to make heavy use of rental
and other non-traditional space in urban areas. In fact, increased urbanization
has likely enhanced the need to explore and achieve various kinds of
decentralization. Finally, school consolidation is a major concern in the ECA
countries, thus involving school closure more than school construction.
School Staffing, Student Allocation, and Opening the School are also important
considerations. It may seem almost tautological, but at some point, the school
needs to open and teachers, administrators, and other non-teaching staff will
need to be assigned to the new school; students need to be assigned to the
school, and the school has to function. While this may not typically be
considered a phase of school construction per se, it is clear that the capital
investments and recurrent costs mutually affect each other. Thus,
infrastructure investments must be coordinated with personnel policies and
vice versa, and capital investments directly impact the recurrent budget going
forward. In practice, the decision to approve a major school infrastructure
project is usually preconditioned on the determination of need based on how
many students will be served. This student count determines staffing, and thus
the overall level of personnel costs would be built into the recurrent budget in
the either before or while the project is being proposed and appraised. Finally,
the deployment of teachers and other staff would follow normal personnel
10

Below we discuss the connection of infrastructure provision with school staffing. Here, it is worth
noting that any compensatory funding formula policy is likely to have some impact on teacherstudent ratios—either indirectly or even directly if class size is used as a weight or criteria for
funding allocation..
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procedures and needs to be timed so that they are in place when the school
opens.
3.

School Construction (including new schools and expansions of existing
schools). The entity that actually takes on the school construction project and
oversees construction can range from the central SCA to the local school
district. And as discussed later, the various components of the process can be
broken down and taken on by different levels of government. There may be
some economies of scale from centralization (e.g., in the purchase of inputs like
cement), but there is also plenty of experience to indicate that centralized
procurement may foster corruption (Theunynck 2002, 2009; DfID 2012)).
Nor, has prefabricated construction has not generally succeeded. There may be
advantages to leveraging local labor, knowledge, materials, and other inputs.
Therefore, a priori, it is not possible to determine the “correct” level of
government for each component of school construction.

4.

Provision of Non-Infrastructure durable goods. These include furniture,
equipment and other capital costs associated with school construction. In
addition, school staffing formulas and other standardized costs have significant
recurrent cost implications for the education system, and because it is highly
likely that different levels of government will be responsible for each, this
highly complicates any decentralization reform efforts compared to network
infrastructure (such as roads, water, etc). And, even if these costs are, like
staffing costs, determined according to norms or formulas, the provision of
these goods need not be done by the same level of government as the
construction project. For instance, a municipality could build a school but
furniture could be central procured for cost savings.

5.

Maintenance (both routine and major rehabilitation): All infrastructure and
school construction has associated implications for on-going maintenance.
Maintenance costs and expenditures are often more decentralized than
construction. For instance, Local Governments may be charged with paying for
and carrying out maintenance; school grants may be used to allow school-level
maintenance, and contributions may be sought or required from community
members and/or parents. Unfortunately, it is common practice to decentralize
responsibility for maintenance to local governments without the
corresponding funds or potential sources of local revenue. This is of course
true for other types of expenditure, but maintenance is the one that most
impacts the value of school construction and the accumulated capital assets. In
addition, maintenance falls under both recurrent and capital expenditure.
Major maintenance is a capital expenditure while minor maintenance is a
recurrent expense with direct impact on the capital asset.

6.

Ex-Post Evaluation: This would include both a variety of audits to verify fiscal
comity and structural integrity, as well as evaluations that determine if schools
are properly designed to support educational goals, construction is of high
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quality and standing the test of time, and school location procedures accurately
reflect actual demand for schools.
Appendix 3 provides a worksheet for planners and policy analysts to consider how
the components of education infrastructure investment and provision are and could
be allocated across different levels of government
It is instructive to consider how one might relate the above six “phases” with the
“usual” 8 steps of any investment cycle developed considerably throughout this
book (Figure 3). The clearest conclusion is that they do not “align” in any straightforward manner. For instance school location decisions are made to a varying
degree across the first 4 cycle steps. In fact, even maintenance, which is primarily
performed as part of the Service Delivery, must be factored in during the first four
steps of project development and design. This means that planners and
policymakers must consider the relationship of each phase with each cycle step. One
could imagine, for instance, a 6 x 8 matrix with 48 cells each detailing the role of a
particular educational infrastructure phase to a key cycle step, and that there could
be considerable variation across countries and individual project. (See Appendix 4
for a “worksheet” for planners to consider Add to this the need to consider the
nature and extent of decentralization for each phase and cycle step, and this
underscores the complexity of the decision-making process and the different
entities involved!
As we discuss further below, it is particularly in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th steps where
many governments exhibit high degrees of centralization and where consideration
of some additional form of decentralization is likely warranted. There are multiple
agencies involved in a complex investment cycle—this complicates considerably
fostering accountability. The next section explores some of the main organizational
arrangements for infrastructure provision under a range of different kinds of
decentralized governance and accountability arrangements.

14
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A taxonomy of school construction and decentralization11
As discussed above, historically in most countries the central government controlled
and implemented virtually the entire school design, location, construction, and
provision of non-infrastructure durable goods processes—particularly during
periods of rapid expansion—and there is considerable international evidence that
this resulted in poor quality and high costs. (Regional government provision fared
little better.) In particular, the problems were: “(i) inadequate classroom allocation,
(ii) weak monitoring capacity of the implementation agency, and (iii) low
construction quality.” More decentralized arrangements (especially with
municipalities) have been more common for routine maintenance and less often for
major rehabilitation. The past two decades have seen considerable experimentation
with various forms of decentralization in the school infrastructure sector beyond
basic maintenance, with some positive results. The most common decentralization
experiences have experimented with various forms of institutional arrangements –
both devolution and delegation from both the central and sub-national governments
to various quasi-governmental and non-governmental organization (as detailed
This section draws heavily upon Serge Theunynck (2002), “School Construction in Developing
Countries: What do we know?” Washington, DC: World Bank. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations
in this section are to this source. Readers interested in project by project detail will benefit greatly
from this paper.
11
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below). Of course, delegation in and of itself will only have positive impacts if there
is accountability; that is, that the principal-agent relationships are built upon proper
incentives, good information and transparency (among other key factors).12 Here we
outline the most common and/or promising institutional relationships associated
with education infrastructure decentralization.13
 Devolution to local governments, which was expected to improve “site
monitoring by local government engineers” as well as “(i) closer monitoring
leading to better work quality, (ii) local bidding, with increased use of local
labor, lower costs and heightened community ownership leading to a greater
commitment to maintenance, (iii) better integration of municipal investment
between sectors.” Little cost savings or other gains were realized in Africa, Asia
and Latin America—with the exception of Mexico’s 1994 major decentralization
effort where substantial unit costs savings came rapidly.
 Community-based approaches have also taken many different forms and so it is
not possible to say that they have worked or not without contextualizing the
particular reform approach for any given country in any given time period. For
instance, when coupled with centralized procurement—justified because of
economies of scale and/or prefabricated design—results have been poor due to
the complexity of supply chain and construction arrangements, failure to make
best use of local knowledge and labor, etc. More positive results accrued to
demand-driven approaches in Mauritania, Mali, Malawi, Uganda,14 India, and
Mexico. These successful community-based construction strategies shared key
characteristics: “(i) only locally available materials are used, (ii) only
construction techniques familiar to villagers and local craftsmen and contractors
are used, (iii) design improvements are limited to those necessary to ensure
standard durability and safety, (iv) duties and responsibilities of partners are
well defined. Regular technical supervision will help in ensuring that quality
standards of construction are met, but does not substitute to close monitoring by
communities…. Community pride in ownership of a well-built school, combined
with appropriate technical advice to local builder is the main factor of quality

There is a large literature on accountability, in particular stemming from the WDR 2004. See
Gershberg, Gonzalez, and Meade (2012) for a detailed exploration of the myriad potential
relationships between principals, agents, and clients.
13 We cannot provide details on the specific accountability relationships in the many projects
considered in the development of this taxonomy, but it stands to reason that the instances that were
successful effectively created incentives by which the “delegates” were answerable to the
stakeholders responsible for service provision. While beyond the scope of this discussion, see
Appendix for a detailed summary of all potential elements.
14 Theunynck (2009) calls Uganda’s community driven development (CDD) approach “the most
important single construction program ever executed in an African country for primary classroom
and sanitation in schools,” having built in 4 years 21,000 classrooms, 20,000 latrines, 325,000 desks,
and 556 teacher houses.
12
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construction.”15
 Delegation to NGOs has sought to leverage the closer connections and trust some
organizations have developed with disadvantaged populations. It has taken
many forms and yielded some positive, if mixed, results. Some build their own
schools, which are often lower cost—in some cases because they have fewer
requirements for non-classroom facilities that government schools, or they may
have looser construction standards or more flexibility in bidding out to
contractors. It may also be that the schools are lower quality in some cases, but
there is not systematic evidence to that effect. (See example of CARE schools in
the Egypt case study). The challenge has generally been scalability.
 Delegation to Contract Management Agencies (CMAs) has proven successful both
in terms of unit costs and project completion, particularly in Africa. CMAs are
“given operation autonomy to implement large-scale small construction
programs, to be carried out by small contractors with local labor. They are
staffed with skilled professionals recruited from the private sector. They select,
pay and supervise contractors and architectural/ engineering services for site
supervision. Their mandate is to promote small and medium enterprises (SME)
by allowing them to bid for contracts. These agencies have changed the ‘rules of
the game’ and have contributed to the growth of the construction industry.” The
initial experiments with CMAs focused on urban areas, spreading to rural areas
after they had established their value. Nevertheless, there are to date still more
successful urban examples.16
The use of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for school construction is an
analogous policy to the delegations to CMAs.
 Social Funds have played an important role in decentralized school construction
often delivering lower unit costs and higher rates of project completion.
Originally a strategy for short term employment in times of crises, social
investment funds have gradually become more permanent fixtures, often acting
as CMAs for their own school construction projects. While most are not
community-based they do always call for some significant level of community
participation and/or involvement of sub-national governments.
Figures 4 and 5 show the relationships between two spectrums of centralized and
decentralized actors as well as public and private actors for two of these categories
In our Egypt case study below we will also explore the potential for community-based approaches
in school design and location.
16 And delegation to CMAs is fraught with challenges of its own. If they are, for insance, undercapitalized when given contracts, without sufficient allowance for advances and cash flow
management (partly out of fear for providing too many advances ahead of results), then there is a
danger that they could fail and abandon the projects anyway. Balancing the need for cash-flow
advances with the need for payment-for-results, with under-capitalized builders, is a factor not
sufficiently considered in many cases.
15
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of institutional arrangements a typical local government delegation and social fund
or CMA arrangement, respectively.

Figure 4: Devolution to local
government
Source, Theunynck (2009)

Figure 5: Delegation to CMA
using a Social fund, after
delegation to local
government
Source, Theunynck (2009)
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It is important to emphasize that these figures only highlight one of many potential
examples of the institutional arrangements for only two of the categories in the
taxonomy above. The possible combinations are myriad and many more are
explored in greater detail in Theunynck (2009). In addition, Appendix 2 provides a
summary of implementation schemes that allows analysts to construct similar
flowcharts for any given set of arrangements either existing or proposed.
Table 3 provides some comparisons of cost differences of the different approaches
from Sub-Saharan Africa. Though care should be taken in the comparisons given the
caveat that quality cannot be compared or assumed constant, the various delegation
models from the above taxonomy do appear to provide significant cost savings.
Table 3

Case Study of a Large, Centralized School Construction Operation: Egypt’s General
Authority for Educational Buildings (GAEB)17
Few would deny that Egypt’s achievements in school construction have been
impressive, even historic. Between 1992 and 2006 the Government built about
14,000 schools, most by the General Authority for Educational Buildings (GAEB),
thus greatly expanding access to and enrolment in basic education especially for the
poorest half of the income distribution. By some accounts, more schools were built

This case study is based upon a study the author did for the Population Council and USAID
(Gershberg and Gohary, 2007). This study used qualitative interview and focus group methods to
gather the interview data presented here.
17
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in this period than in the preceding 110 years.18 Thus, the centralized approach
made sense at these earlier stages of educational development, especially after a
severe earthquake required swift rebuilding of infrastructure and inspired highly
restrictive building codes.
Yet there is a wide-spread impression that school construction in Egypt is also too
expensive for the quality of service provided—inefficient both in the cost of
construction and in the match between the structures built and the needs of
stakeholders—and that these inefficiencies are in no small part due to centralization
of the design, planning and construction processes in GAEB. In particular, this case
sheds light on the issue of school location, community involvement and
decentralization.
There are lower cost models of school construction, most interestingly from the arm
of the government providing religious schools (Al-Azhar), which are about 33% less
expensive on a per classroom basis.19 While officially part of the central
government, these schools are not run by the Ministry of Education nor are the
schools built by GAEB. For its part, GAEB claims that the Al-Azhar schools are of
lower quality, particularly with respect to earthquake risk, an assertion that is hard
to refute in the absence of major earthquakes.
The NGO-built CARE schools also have lower unit costs (about 22% less costly), in
part through focusing more tightly on classroom rather than on non-class room
construction. Additional inefficiencies stem from several pervasive problems with
the incentive environment for educational infrastructure provision:
The agency in charge of school construction and contracting (GAEB) also plans,
proposes, and decides the type and quantity of schools needed.
 This creates a conflict of interest—the larger the investment amount, the
greater the contracting function).
 Despite claims of high-tech mapping and school location and demand models,
GAEB has shown poor population forecasting, in part because
o The agency in charge of school construction & contracting also
forecasts population growth to determine needs
o The same agency decides the type, quantity and locations of schools
required.
o This creates a conflict of interest—the greater the estimated needs,
the larger the contracting function.

18MOE,

National Strategic Education Plan 2007/08 – 2011/12. This figure may also include schools
built by donors and NGOs whose construction was overseen by and coordinated with the MOE and
GAEB.
19 These figures come of the World Bank Public Expenditure Review (World Bank, 2005).
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While never a singular solution, decentralization of some form would likely mitigate
some of GAEB’s biggest challenges. For instance, one of the major issues included
building schools where they were not needed but where the price of land was low
(or could be acquired for free), which led to providing schools where existing
crowding did not demand it, and leaving crowded schools just as crowded. This is a
function of an accountability that emphasizes the number of schools built, and not
the satisfaction of parents and communities with the schools. Historically this might
have not been so problematic, as low-population-density areas tended to be those
with lower enrollment rates. But as enrollment became nearly universal, the
problems of overcrowding became more significant than the problems of noncoverage, and the areas with over-crowding tended to be those with the more
expensive land. Almost by definition, jurisdictions with cheaper land tended to be
those that where schools were less over-crowded.
So not only was the system centralized, but it did not allocate resources in a rational
way. If the system was somewhat decentralized, and had to allocate construction
according to some transparent criteria, the strangeness of allocating funding to
areas with cheap land would become clearer, and the system would find itself
pressured to allocate more money to areas with overcrowding.
In part driven by the exposure of inefficiencies in GAEB, the Egyptian Government
undertook a highly public program to bring the private sector into the school
construction game through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). In theory PPPs can
leverage private sector access to capital markets where bond markets are less
robust. Unfortunately PPP has not been successful in Egypt for several reasons, chief
among them that the private sector needs even larger scale contracts to make bids
worthwhile, and these have proven untenable given the risk involved with have to
trust in 10-15 year relationship with Egyptian Government. The events of the Arab
Spring have perhaps born out those risks. The end result is that GAEB ended up
being the contractor for most of the PPP bidders!
Still, decentralizing GAEB in other ways has been part of the government’s reform
rhetoric for nearly a decade. Yet progress has been very slow. In part, the lack of
reform stems from a political economy that generates strong incentives to remain
centralized. . GAEB has operated as a nearly autonomous unit run by military
generals allocating vast sums of resources. Decentralization signifies a major loss of
power for these stakeholders. On the other hand, the case shows that under most
conditions educational infrastructure decentralization is likely to be a long, complex,
hard slog. A few capital investment and maintenance responsibilities have indeed
been transferred to the regional (governorate) level of the MOE and/or GAEB—
known as the “muderiyas.” A couple of examples are the purchase and installation of
educational technology in new buildings along with major maintenance funding at
technical schools. While schools now receive control over some minor maintenance
funds. Whether such developments are stepping stones towards more significant
reform is hard to tell. Since the transition to the government lead by Mohammed
Morsi after the fall of Hosni Mubarek, the GAEB has its first civilian director.
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IN 2010, a major consultancy through USAID argued to the Egyptian government
that national conditions…
…call for a system where infrastructural needs are identified locally at the Idara [district]
level, vetted and approved for funding at the Markaz [regional] level by Local Popular
Councils (LPCs) via ear-marked decentralized fiscal transfers, and coordinated subnationally at the governorate level as part of the governor’s portfolio where he ensures that
MoE’s strategy and directions are followed and implemented, and where tradeoffs between
idaras are assessed and decided (following nationally-set criteria). To induce local entities to
choose efficiently within the construction envelope, the Idara must keep its own formulagiven money if it can carry out savings. The idara (perhaps as mediated by the mudiriya)
should also act as a client and commission the services of the local GAEB governorate
office to act as a project manager for the Idara as a client. Distribution of funds may, at least
in the beginning, be based on a formula or formula-like mechanism that takes specific local
access needs into account, perhaps along with the human development index (HDI) of an
Idara. This combination may allow for the use of valid indicators that can be specific enough
for MoE to gauge infrastructure earmarking.20

This is similar to proposals in a 2007 strategic plan and a 2005 World Bank Public
Expenditure Review. The point is not that there is not change, but that it is slow and
highly political.
Table 4 revisits the decentralization matrix presented above (Table 1) and explores
the potential application to our Egyptian school construction case study. We explain
the manner in which each aspect of decentralization is (or more importantly could or
should be) present in reform efforts.21
Perhaps the most important point to highlight is that most of the aspects are present
de facto to some extent and all are relevant. That is, it is not fruitful to provide a
single label for the decentralization reforms of Egyptian school construction and the
reality is that it is a complex mix of many components—some weakly decentralized
and other less so. The analysis also indicates the absence of the “stronger,” more
“bottom up,” more “local” decentralization that many analysts have hypothesized
are more likely to improve accountability. Below we present briefly the results of
qualitative analysis with local stakeholders that puts some meat on the bone of this
framework and the inefficiencies that remain, at least in part, due to the continued
strong centralization of the institutions and the fact that the most prominent
decentralization components are what we labeled “vertical,” which we argued are
less likely to yield positive outcomes and foster accountability than more
“horizontal” decentralization.

RTI, Planning the Decentralization of School Infrastructure, Discussion Document 9-2-2010
Note that we do not attempt to disentangle the de facto reality of actual practice, which is quite
often weaker than de jure. De facto practice is, of course, more important with respect to fostering the
actual accountability gains reforms hope to accrue from decentralization, but uncovering that is
beyond the scope of this case study
20
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Table 4: Potential application of Decentralization Matrix to Egyptian School
Construction Case
Decentralization
Issues and likely application to GAEB and
Component
Egyptian Case
Deconcentration to
At the governorate level, GAEB has offices that have
Regional Government
traditionally been involved as implementers of
Offices and Regional MOE
central plans under tight control. Some increase in
Offices
autonomy has been announced by GAEB and will
certainly be needed
Devolution to regional or
local governments

Delegation (and/or
Devolution) to schools
and/or school councils

Delegation to NGOs,
Contract Management
Agencies (CMAs) and/or
Social Funds
Implicit delegation to
community schools and
community based
approaches

Governorates are supposed to provide input into
plans, fiscal allocations, and project implementation.
Pilot projects have shown promise (especially
regarding maintenance, ICTand some vocational
classrooms) but also the difficulty of GAEB ceding
real control. Recognition of need to involve local
governments but very little (and/or very
problematic) in practice
School councils (Boards of Trustees) established at
many schools officially, many do not operate in
practice or have significant power. In any case, even
in de jure terms, the powers and duties of the
Boards of Trustees were not always clear (they
were not fully specified and yet non-overlapping
with the powers and duties of other bodies) though
the regulations on this aspect did improve in the
late 2000s. Some control over some maintenance
projects, none over major renovation.
In theory, this practice could prove fruitful, but has
not been tried in a strict sense. Public Private
Partnership (PPP) garnered much attention in the
early 2000s but was largely unsuccessful for many
reasons.
Virtually no input from communities on crucial
issue of new school location and construction. Very
much needed in future.

In addition to high unit costs for school construction, there are several other
“typical” inefficiencies evident in the Egyptian case study of GAEB relating to school
design and school location that appear to imply potential reasons for some
decentralization. For instance,

BOX: Stakeholder Insights on School Location in Egypt
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(Gershberg and Gohary, 2007) examined issues with school location for the Population Council
and USAID. They used qualitative interview and focus group methods to gather the
impressions and insights of local actors (parents, school directors, and teachers) regarding
school location. Here is a selection of direct quotations from the interview and focus group
data. Allowing the voices of the stakeholders to emerge lends power and substance to many of
the key arguments developed through our case study..
"If the land is government-owned, they build wherever they like; if the inhabitants donated the
land, they build on it".
"No-one consulted us. The land is owned by the government, and they decided to build a
school there”.
"They don't ask anyone's opinion. If the Ministry cared enough to ask, some problems would
be avoided, such as the unsavory social environment around the school”
"The students come a long way, and they have to walk on the main road, where there are
vehicles driven by young kids, many of whom don't have a driver's license. The girls leave
school in the evening shift at 5 or 6 p.m., and they walk a long way in the fields alone."
"Some students walk five or six kilometers to get to school."
"It's completely inappropriate that we're directly on the road; it's the Agricultural Highway.
Most of the kids come from the same three or four villages, which causes a drop out problem
because the school is far away from where the kids live”
"There are three or four road accidents annually... In the fields there are kidnappers, because
the school is far away from the pupils' homes. Last year a student was kidnapped... The kids
also walk across the canals by balancing on drainage pipes, so naturally there's a risk of falling
in”.
"It's very hard to get to school. We walk five routes, all of which are very dangerous”.

 There is often no differentiation in design between urban and rural areas,
high population density or remote areas, between high-risk earthquake
zones and lower risk etc.
Not surprisingly, thus, many schools have inappropriate designs for local conditions
and local people
In short, there is simply no way that a central bureaucracy—even armed with
remote sensing, GIS, and the best population projections available—can collect, in a
cost effective manner, the data necessary to make the best decisions regarding
school location to avoid such hazards. A few excerpts from interviews of
stakeholders exemplify the concerns of school administrators and community
members alike (See Box). Clearly local knowledge of parents and school staff should
be solicited and given serious consideration in school location decisions. The same
is likely true for other aspects of school construction.
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Concluding remarks
Perhaps the simplest but very important point is that while a typology of school
construction decentralization is useful for identifying the components of a reform
and exploring which components are more (or less) likely to enhance accountability,
classifying or labeling a complex decentralization reform into a “type” is not
particularly fruitful. In fact most country contexts will exhibit some degree of
decentralization along most if not all of the potential components of a reform.
One important point to take from the Egypt case, that we argue may generalize to
other cases, is that when the main issue is massive out-of-school numbers,
governments can put a school anywhere, even with overly-centralized and standard
design, and, assuming that out-of-school problems are mostly supply-side issues,
then students will fill the new schools. But as countries have progressed, at least
three things have happened.
i.

ii.

iii.

First, in some areas schools are over-crowded, and then the decision to add
more spaces by adding to schools, by buying expensive but close-by land to
build new ones, etc requires more subtle, localized information and
interaction; therefore such progress appears to strengthen the case for some
decentralization.
Second, as countries put most of the children into school, the ones that
remain out of school are increasingly special, harder to reach and serve
populations—the extreme poor and disenfranchised, the disabled, nomadic
families, populations with different cultures (ethnic or linguistic
minorities)—whose needs are often best met with special-purpose
infrastructure.
Third, the more infrastructure has been built in the past, the more there is a
need for the recurrent cost of maintenance, by definition, and maintenance is
often best done locally, since a central location has a hard time deciding in
which local school to fix broken windows and in which local schools to paint
the walls, or fix the bathrooms. This is to argue that, as countries have
advanced, the arguments favoring some form of decentralization, as outlined
in Table 2 above, increase. However, this leaves each country with a very
important and very difficult set of institutional incentives and arrangements
to ensure accountability: namely, when school construction is centralized
and school operations and maintenance decentralized, what are the right
institutional arrangements for giving decentralized governments the right
incentives to keep building maintenance at the right level?

In addition, our discussion highlights important factors for policymakers to consider
when contemplating decentralization and intergovernmental relations in
educational infrastructure provision
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 While Sub-national governments are often the focus of infrastructure
decentralization reforms, they are only one among a long list of other entities
and stakeholders involved. On the one hand, this means at least very
carefully thinking through the inter-institutional relationships and
environment within which sub-national governments operate. On the other
hand, it could mean that under some conditions sub-national government
need not be the central focus of any given reform in any given country
context.
 Our discussion also illustrates clearly how imperative it is to consider and
explore how conditions and opportunities change over time, and that it is a
very different task to provide for infrastructure where the out-of-school
population is 30% versus 3%--the latter case often favoring decentralization
for various reasons explored above. The mix of conditions and effective
components of a school infrastructure decentralization strategy is obviously
quite different in Egypt compared to Niger, and in Egypt in 1990 compared to
Egypt in 2010. This latter evolution presents a challenge for decentralization
policies in that institutions (especially strong centralized, school construction
authorities) almost by definition resist change and are slow to decentralize
(at best).
 Planning and Appraisal, especially location and design features are two areas
where the role of local government and communities may be particularly
important and particularly difficult to achieve
 Financing and Procurement: while there is no generalizable formula for
successful improvement, it is clear that
o this area offers big potential costs and cost savings: various
decentralized strategies appear to lower costs and foster
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness (and provide likely
political gains, too)
o “earmarking” and other fixed or formula-driven costs (recurrent and
capital) associated with construction are strategies worth considering
o equalization transfers or other redistributive fiscal transfers are key
to enhancing equity. And, it is important to consider how to include
maintenance and infrastructure expenditures into these transfers
 Community-based approaches, Intermediary NGOs, Social Funds, and
Contract Management Agencies (CMAs) all hold promise for accountability
and performance enhancement across many of the key phases of the
infrastructure planning and school construction—as does the use of medium
and sometimes small scale contractors.
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 There is likely a need for a continued strong role at the central level in school
design and standards, even while there are many reasons why in reality this
may foster inefficiencies. As in any decentralization effort, it’s crucial that the
center set the “rules of the game” clearly and enforce them consistently and
transparently
 There is not nearly enough attention to evaluating the potential and actual
impact of decentralization reforms on cost and other key aspects of
construction programs. And there is hardly any ex-post evaluation of the
actual performance of school buildings as an input to either attendance or
learning.
We believe the discussion in this paper has made clear that various fiscal levers and
institutional arrangements can often be applied to achieve better implementation.
However, without equal attention to the critical issues of school design and location
also highlighted in this paper, the dilemma is the risk that a country better
implements poorly designed schools. To avoid this paradox some parallel
application of organizational models we have explored are justified and are
warranted. This type of organizational asymmetry holds promise for improved
efficiency for decentralized education infrastructure.
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Annex 1: Application of OECD’s locus of decision-making framework to examine the
range of centralization and decentralization in a sample of countries
Table A1 shows the level of governmental authority responsible for three relevant
decisions: 1) the allocation of capital expenditure resources to schools, 2) the
decision over how schools use those resources, and 3) the decision to create or close
a school, which impacts school construction and location.22 The table also shows the
relative autonomy that governmental authority has over the decision (in full
autonomy versus being required to consult with another governmental level to
make the decision23).
Table A1. source: Author adaptation of OECD Education at a Glance 2012.

Unfortunately, the first two relate only to capital investment at already constructed schools and the
third is only the broadest decision related to the issue of school location for new construction and the
potential re-use of existing infrastructure. It would be very useful in future if OECD could expand the
questions on capital investment in their survey to cover school design, location, and construction.
23 “Other” means the authority over decision-making cannot be categorized by either of these two
descriptions
22
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Appendix 3: Worksheet for Educational Infrastructure Provision and Reform
Central
Central Central
Other
Ministry Construction Central
Agency
Ministries,
etc

Regional
Regional
Regional
Municipal
deconcentrated government Governunits of central
ment
ministries

School Design
School Location
School
Construction,
new school
School
Construction,
expansion of
existing school
Provision of Noninfrastructure
durables
Maintenance,
major
rehabilitation
Maintenance,
routine
Ex-Post
Evaluation

1

Local
Community Stakeholders

Schoollevel
Actors
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Appendix 3: Worksheet for Educational Infrastructure Provision and Reform
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&
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